Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-12-2018

Brief of Amici Curiae - Copyright and Intellectual
Property Law Professors in Support of DefendantPetitioner Pandora Media, Inc.
Tyler T. Ochoa
Santa Clara University School of Law, ttochoa@scu.edu

Joseph C. Gratz
Durie Tangri, LLP

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Automated Citation
Tyler T. Ochoa and Joseph C. Gratz, Brief of Amici Curiae - Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of DefendantPetitioner Pandora Media, Inc. (2018),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/946

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

Case No. S240649
In the

Supreme Court
of the

State of California
FLO & EDDIE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PANDORA MEDIA, INC.,
Defendant-Petitioner.
___________
Questions Certified from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, Case No. 15-55287
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of California, Case No. CV14-7648 PSG
The Honorable Philip S. Gutierrez
Magistrate Judge Ralph Zarefsky
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE COPYRIGHT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PROFESSORS
IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER PANDORA MEDIA, INC.
JOSEPH C. GRATZ
PROF. TYLER T. OCHOA
(STATE BAR NO. 240676)
(STATE BAR NO. 140004)
DURIE TANGRI LLP
SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY
217 Leidesdorff Street
SCHOOL OF LAW
San Francisco, CA 94111
500 El Camino Real
(415) 362-6666
Santa Clara, CA 95053
jgratz@durietangri. com
(408) 554-2765
ttochoa@scu.edu

Counsel for Amici Curiae
Copyright and Intellectual
Property Law Professors

CERTIFIC
C
CATE OF
F INTERE
ESTED P
PERSONS
S OR ENT
TITIES
Purssuant to California Rule
R
of Coourt 8.208
8, counsel
certifies th
hat the Am
mici Curiaee are all n
natural perrsons, and
d that
Amici
A
Curiiae are not aware off any perssons or enttities otheer than
th
he named parties th
hat have a financiall or other interest in
n the
outcome off this proce
eeding, ass those terrms are deefined in
California
C
Rule of Co
ourt 8.208
8(e).
DATED:
D
January
J
12
2, 2018
Josseph C. Grratz
RIE TANGR
RI LLP
DUR
Cou
unsel for A
Amici Curriae
Cop
pyright an
nd Intellecctual
Prooperty Law
w Professoors

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE NO.
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS OR
ENTITIES .............................................................................2
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI
CURIAE ................................................................................8
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..........................................................9
ARGUMENT .................................................................................. 10
I.

When the Disputed Statutory Phrase
“Exclusive Ownership” Was First Enacted
in 1872, Common-Law Copyright
Encompassed Only the Right of First
Publication (Reproduction and Sale), and
Did Not Include A Right of Public
Performance. ............................................................ 10

II.

For 75 Years, It Has Been Considered
Settled Law That There Is No Public
Performance Right for Sound Recordings. ............. 19

III.

Applying a Public Performance Right
Under California Law to National
Broadcasters Would Improperly Extend
California Law to Performances Occurring
Wholly Outside the Borders of the State. .............. 25

CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 27
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.............................................. 29
APPENDIX: LIST OF AMICI CURIAE....................................... 30
PROOF OF SERVICE ................................................................... 32

3

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE NO(S).
Cases (United States Jurisdiction)
Bakersfield Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue
(9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3d 767..................................................... 11
Banker v. Caldwell
(1859) 3 Minn. 94 ...................................................................... 13
Barber v. Palo Verde Mutual Water Co.
(1926) 198 Cal. 649 ................................................................... 11
Bartlett v. Crittenden
(C.C.D. Ohio 1849) 2 F.Cas. 967 .............................................. 13
Boucicault v. Fox
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) 3 F.Cas. 977............................................. 19
Brailsford v. Blue
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 335 ................................................................. 11
Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co.
(1909) 215 U.S. 182 ................................................................... 14
Crowe v. Aiken
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1870) 6 F.Cas. 904........................................ 18, 19
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.
(2d Cir. 1934) 73 F.2d 276 ........................................................ 14
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.
(2016) 28 N.Y.3d 583 .......................................................... 23, 24
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.
(Fla. 2017) 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471 .............................................. 21
Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) 62 F.Supp.3d 325 ........................................... 28

4

Keene v. Kimball
(1860) 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 545 ..................................... 17, 18, 20
Keene v. Wheatley
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) 14 F.Cas. 180 ........................................... 18
National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc.
(2d Cir. 1951) 191 F.2d 594 ...................................................... 14
Oertel v. Jacoby
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1872) 44 How. Pr. 179 ........................................ 13
Palmer v. De Witt
(1872) 47 N.Y. 532.............................................................. passim
Parton v. Prang
(C.C.D. Mass. 1872) 18 F.Cas. 1273 ........................................ 16
RCA Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman
(2d Cir. 1940) 114 F.2d 86, cert. denied (1940) 311
U.S. 712 .............................................................................. passim
Roberts v. Myers
(C.C.D. Mass. 1860) 20 F.Cas. 898 .......................................... 19
Sam Francis Foundation v. Christie’s, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2015) 784 F.3d 1320 (en banc) .................................. 27
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station
(Pa. 1937) 194 A. 631 ................................................................ 20
Wheaton v. Peters
(1834) 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 .................................................. 12, 13
Woolsey v. Judd
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1855) 11 How. Pr. 49 .......................................... 15
Cases (Foreign Jurisdiction)
Coleman v. Wathen
(Eng. 1793) 101 Eng.Rep. 137 [5 T.R. 245].............................. 16

5

Murray v. Elliston
(Eng. 1822) 106 Eng.Rep. 1331 [5 Barn. & Ald.
657] ............................................................................................ 16
Statutes and Codes (United States Jurisdiction)
17 U.S.C. § 301 ............................................................................... 25
1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) ........................................ 25
1 Civil Code of the State of New York (Proposed Draft
1865) .......................................................................................... 14
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 ............................. 16, 19
California Civil Code § 980..................................................... passim
California Civil Code § 983.......................................... 14, 15, 23, 25
California Civil Code § 984............................................................ 22
Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436 ............................. 15
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212 ................. 15, 16
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 66-28 ......................................................... 20
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-3-510 ............................................................. 21
Sound Recording Amendments Act of 1971, Pub.L.
No. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 1971), § 1, 85 Stat. 391 ........................... 24
Statutes and Codes (Foreign Jurisdiction)
3 Will. 4 c. 15, § 1 (Eng.) ................................................................ 16
Legislative Materials
H.R. Rep. 92-487 (1971), reprinted in 1971
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566 .................................................................... 24
Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 566 (1947
Reg. Sess.)............................................................................ 22, 23

6

Government Studies
Report of the Register of Copyrights, Copyright
Implications of Digital Audio Transmission
Services (Oct. 1991) .................................................................. 26
Report of the Register of Copyrights, Federal
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings (Dec. 2011) ............................................................. 28
Ringer, Copyright Law Revision Study No. 26, The
Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings
(1957) ......................................................................................... 20
Commentators
1A Singer and Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction (7th ed. 2007) § 22:33 ......................................... 11
2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (1827) ......................... 13
2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (Holmes ed.
1873) .......................................................................................... 14
Bard and Kurlantzick, A Public Performance Right in
Recordings: How to Alter the Copyright System
Without Improving It (1974) 43 Geo. Wash. L.Rev.
152, 155 ............................................................................... 21, 27
Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright (1847)................ 15, 16
Lee, The Civil Law and Field’s Civil Code in
Common-Law California: A Note on What Might
Have Been (1992) 5 West. Leg. Hist. 13 ............................. 14, 15
Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right
(2010) 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1381 .............................. 17, 19, 20
Parks, Music and Copyright in America: Toward the
Celestial Jukebox (2012) .............................................. 20, 21, 22

7

IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae, whose names and institutional affiliations are
listed in the Appendix, are all professors who teach and write
about copyright law or about intellectual property law in
general.* Amici are unbiased observers who do not have any
financial interest in the outcome of this litigation. The only
interest that amici have in this litigation is a respect for the
historical development of copyright law, and a commitment to the
orderly development of copyright law in the future. Amici are
also concerned that recognizing a public performance right for
sound recordings under California law, for the first time, would
improperly extend California law outside the borders of the state,
since broadcast signals cannot be confined to the borders of a
single state. Amici do not necessarily agree on the merits of a
public performance right for sound recordings, but amici agree
that 1) historically there has not been any public performance
right in sound recordings under California law, and 2) the issue
should be addressed on a nationwide basis, by Congress,
prospectively, rather than on a piecemeal basis through state-bystate litigation.

All signatories speak only on behalf of themselves. Institutional
affiliations are listed for identification purposes only.
*
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff Flo & Eddie, Inc., contends that the phrase
“exclusive ownership” in California Civil Code section 980
includes all possible uses to which a copyrightable work may be
put, including an exclusive right of public performance. At the
time California Civil Code section 980 was first enacted in 1872,
however, the phrase “exclusive ownership” in relation to a
copyrightable work meant something different and much
narrower: namely, the right of first publication (reproduction
and sale) only. Since the phrase “exclusive ownership” was
retained without change in the subsequent 1947 and 1982
amendments to Civil Code section 980, the phrase should be
interpreted today in accordance with its original, common-law
meaning. Moreover, for the past 75 years it has been considered
settled law that there were no public performance rights in sound
recordings under state law. If this Court were to interpret
California Civil Code section 980 to grant such rights, for the first
time, such a ruling would apply not only to Internet broadcasters,
but also to every radio and television network and broadcast
station whose signal reaches viewers and listeners located in
California. Because broadcast signals cannot be confined to the
borders of a single state, such a ruling would improperly burden
communication to out-of-state listeners as well, in violation of the
dormant commerce clause.

9

ARGUMENT
I.

WHEN THE DISPUTED STATUTORY PHRASE
“EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP” WAS FIRST ENACTED
IN 1872, COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT
ENCOMPASSED ONLY THE RIGHT OF FIRST
PUBLICATION (REPRODUCTION AND SALE), AND
DID NOT INCLUDE A RIGHT OF PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE.
As originally enacted in 1872, Civil Code section 980 read

as follows:
The author of any product of the mind . . . has an
exclusive ownership therein, and in the
representation or expression thereof, which continues
so long as the product and the representations or
expressions thereof made by him remain in his
possession.
Section 980 has been amended three times since 1872 (in
1947, 1949, and 1982). Each time the statute was amended, the
language that the trial court construed, “exclusive ownership,”
was retained without change. Under basic principles of statutory
interpretation, if the Legislature retains the language of a statute
without change, the Court should presume that the Legislature
intended the meaning of that language to remain the same.1
1A Singer and Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction (7th
ed. 2007) § 22:33; Brailsford v. Blue (1962) 57 Cal.2d 335, 339
(“Parts of an amended statute not affected by the amendment
will be given the same construction that they received before the
amendment.”); Barber v. Palo Verde Mutual Water Co. (1926) 198
Cal. 649, 651-52 (“a clause in a statute will be given no different
meaning after an amendment than it had before, if the
amendment relates to other matters”); see also Bakersfield
Energy Partners, L.P. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue (9th Cir.
1

10

Therefore, in order to understand what the phrase “exclusive
ownership” means today, the Court should consider what that
language meant to the Legislature when it was enacted in 1872.
In 1872, copyright protection in the United States was
shared between state law and federal law. Before a work was
published, it was protected by state law (so-called “common-law
copyright”), which provided the author an exclusive right of first
publication (reproduction and sale).2 Once a work was published,
state-law protection was divested,3 and one of two things

2009) 568 F.3d 767, 775 (“As a general rule, we construe words in
a new statute that are identical to words in a prior statute as
having the same meaning.”).
See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters (1834) 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 595
(“That an author, at common law, has a property in his
manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who
deprives him of it, or by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours
to realise a profit by its publication, cannot be doubted; but this is
a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual and
exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the
author shall have published it”); Palmer v. De Witt (1872) 47 N.Y.
532, 536 (“The author of a literary work or composition has, by
[common] law, a right to the first publication of it. He has a right
to determine whether it shall be published at all, and if
published, when, where, by whom, and in what form. This
exclusive right is confined to the first publication.”).

2

Wheaton v. Peters, supra, 33 U.S. at page 657 (distinguishing
the common-law right before publication from a right “after the
author shall have published it”); id. at pages 657-62 (rejecting
four arguments in favor of a common-law right after publication);
Palmer v. De Witt, supra, 47 N.Y. at page 537 (“This common-law
right ‘of first publication’ is sometimes spoken of as ‘copyright
before publication’”); id. at page 539 (“When once published, with

3
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happened. If the work was published with proper copyright
notice, and other statutory formalities such as registration were
satisfied, the work obtained a federal statutory copyright of
limited duration.4 If the work was published without proper
notice or without complying with statutory formalities, the work
entered the public domain.5

the assent of the author, it becomes the property of the world,
subject only to such rights as the author may have secured under
[statutory] copyright laws”); Banker v. Caldwell (1859) 3 Minn.
94, 104 (“it is clear that in the United States an author has no
exclusive property in a published work except under some act of
congress.”).
Wheaton v. Peters, supra, 33 U.S. at pages 663-64 (“when the
legislature are about to vest an exclusive right in an author or an
inventor, they have the power to prescribe the conditions on
which such right shall be enjoyed; and that no one can avail
himself of such right who does not substantially comply with the
requisitions of the law.”).

4

Palmer v. De Witt, supra, 47 N.Y. at page 536 (“When once
published it is dedicated to the public, and the author has not, at
common-law, any exclusive right to multiply copies of it or to
control the subsequent issues of copies by others.”); Banker v.
Caldwell, supra, 3 Minn. at page 104 (“It is the publication [of a
manuscript] which is regarded as an abandonment of the
exclusive property in the contents. It is a voluntary presentation
of it to the public, and any one may use it to such purpose as he
may see fit.”); Bartlett v. Crittenden (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) 2 F.Cas.
967, 968-69 (No. 1,076) (“the author who publishes his work,
dedicates it to the public.”); Oertel v. Jacoby (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1872)
44 How. Pr. 179, 187-88 (“[T]here has been a publication by the
plaintiffs of the pictures mentioned in the injunction. . . . [The
defendants] have the right to reproduce the pictures that have
been voluntarily given to the public.”); see also id. at pages 181-82
(argument of Roger A. Pryor, for defendants); 2 Kent,

5
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David Dudley Field, who drafted the proposed New York
Civil Code on which the California Civil Code was based,6 was
familiar with these principles and incorporated them into the
Civil Code. Section 980 provided that an author had “exclusive
ownership” of a work, “so long as [it] remain[ed] in his
possession.” However, section 983 provided that:
If the owner of a product of the mind intentionally
makes it public, a copy or reproduction may be made
public by any person, without responsibility to the
owner, so far as the law of this State is concerned.

Commentaries on American Law (1827), page 299 (when writings
are “published with the author’s consent, they become common
property, and subject to the free use of the community.”); 2 Kent,
Commentaries on American Law (Holmes ed. 1873), page *365
(same).
The same relationship between state common-law copyright and
federal statutory copyright was carried forward in the 1909
Copyright Act, which remained in effect until January 1, 1978.
See, e.g., Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co. (1909) 215 U.S.
182, 188; National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc. (2d Cir. 1951) 191 F.2d 594, 598; Fleischer
Studios, Inc. v. Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc. (2d Cir. 1934) 73 F.2d
276, 277.
Sections 980 and 983 of the California Civil Code, as originally
enacted in 1872, are identical to sections 429 and 432 of the
proposed Civil Code of the State of New York, which was drafted
by Field. See 1 Civil Code of the State of New York (Proposed
Draft 1865), pages 130-31; Lee, The Civil Law and Field’s Civil
Code in Common-Law California: A Note on What Might Have
Been (1992) 5 West. Leg. Hist. 13, 26 (“Field’s 1865 draft of a
proposed civil code for the State of New York became
substantially the civil codes of the adopting states.”).

6
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In other words, if the copyright owner published the work
(or otherwise “intentionally ma[de] it public”), state-law copyright
protection was divested.7
What was the “exclusive ownership” that a work enjoyed
under state law prior to first publication? At the time Field
drafted his proposed Civil Code, between 1857 and 1865,8 a
copyright owner under federal law enjoyed only “the sole right
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and vending” the
work. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436.9 Similarly,
the common-law protection afforded under state law consisted
only of a right of first publication (reproduction and sale) of the
work.10 This is confirmed by Civil Code section 983, which
Why did Field use the phrase “intentionally made it public”
rather than “intentionally published it”? At the time, there was a
debate as to whether the public performance of a play had the
same effect as a “publication” in divesting the common-law
copyright in the work. Field may have intended to side with
those authorities that held that public performance was sufficient
to divest the common-law copyright in a work.
7

8

Lee, supra, at page 25.

In the Copyright Act of 1870, Congress added the verbs
“completing, copying, executing, [and] finishing” to the list, as
well as “the right to dramatize or translate their own works.”
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 212.
9

Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Copyright (1847), page 11
(“The right to multiply copies of what is written or printed, and to
take therefor whatever other possession mankind are willing to
give in exchange, constitutes the whole claim of literary
property.”); Woolsey v. Judd (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1855) 11 How. Pr. 49,
55 (common-law copyright is the right to decide “whether the
manuscript shall be published at all; and in all cases to forbid its

10

14

allowed anyone to make and distribute “a copy or reproduction”
after the work was first “intentionally mad[e] public” by the
owner.
In England, common-law copyright did not include any
right of public performance.11 An English statute enacted in 1833
gave the author of a dramatic work a statutory right of public
performance. 3 Will. 4 c. 15, § 1 (Eng.). In 1856, Congress
likewise enacted a public performance right for dramatic works
only (Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138), which was
carried forward in the Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16
Stat. 212. Before 1856, there were no public performance rights
of any kind in the United States, for any types of works. As Prof.
Jessica Litman has demonstrated, it was only after 1856 that
publication by another.”); see also Palmer v. DeWitt, supra, 47
N.Y. at page 536 (“The author of a literary work or composition
has, by [common] law, a right to the first publication of it. He
has a right to determine whether it shall be published at all, and
if published, when, where, by whom, and in what form. This
exclusive right is confined to first publication.”); Parton v. Prang
(C.C.D. Mass. 1872) 18 F.Cas. 1273, 1277 (describing “the
exclusive right of property” in an unpublished work as the right
to “forbid its publication by another before it has been published
by him or by his consent or allowance,” and “to prevent another
from multiplying copies of it or reproducing” it).
Murray v. Elliston (Eng. 1822) 106 Eng.Rep. 1331 [5 Barn. &
Ald. 657]; Coleman v. Wathen (Eng. 1793) 101 Eng.Rep. 137 [5
T.R. 245]; see also Curtis, supra, page 104; Palmer v. De Witt,
supra, 47 N.Y. at page 542 (“Until the passage in England of the
statutes 3 and 4 William IV (chap. 15), an author could not
prevent any one from publicly performing on the stage any drama
in which the author possessed the copyright.”).

11
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authors who failed to qualify for the federal statutory copyright
began to claim that there was a common-law right of public
performance for unpublished works. Litman, The Invention of
Common Law Play Right (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1381,
1403-09. The handful of cases decided before 1872, however,
carefully distinguished the established right to make and sell
copies (common-law copyright) from the newly-asserted right of
public performance, and most rejected the notion that there was
a common-law right of public performance.
A leading case was Keene v. Kimball (1860) 82 Mass. (16
Gray) 545, in which the actress Laura Keene claimed to be the
assignee of the common-law copyright in the unpublished play
Our American Cousin, which had been publicly performed
frequently. She sought an injunction to prevent the defendant
from performing the play at a competing venue. The court
rejected the injunction, holding that the defendants could
publicly perform the play so long as they did so from memory,
without having made any copies of it:
It should perhaps be added, to avoid misconstruction,
that we do not intend in this decision to intimate that
there is any right to report, phonographically or
otherwise, a lecture or other written discourse, which
its author delivers before a public audience, . . . and
to publish it without his consent, or to make any use
of a copy thus obtained. The student who attends a
medical lecture may have a perfect right to remember
as much as he can, and afterward to use the
information thus acquired in his own medical
practice, or to communicate it to students or classes
of his own, without involving the right to commit the
lecture to writing, for the purpose of subsequent
publication in print, or by oral delivery. So any one of
16

the audience at a concert or opera may play a tune
which his ear has enabled him to catch, or sing a song
which he may carry away in his memory, for his own
entertainment or that of others, for compensation or
gratuitously, while he would have no right to copy or
publish the musical composition.
Id. at pages 551-52.12 In so holding, the court relied on, but
distinguished, Keene v. Wheatley (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) 14 F.Cas.
180 (No. 7,644), in which the court specifically found that the
defendants had not performed the play from memory, but from a
copy surreptitiously obtained by breach of confidence. Id. at page
207. Nonetheless, the court indicated that if the facts were
otherwise, the defendants could publicly perform the play
without restriction:
In the absence of any legislation for the special
protection of dramatic literary property, an
authorized public circulation of a printed copy of a
drama for which there is a legislative copyright is a
publication which legalizes an optional subsequent
theatrical representation by anybody from such
copy. . . .
If the previous performance of it [the play] at her
theatre had been the means of enabling the
defendants fairly to bring it out at their theatre, the
suit could not have been maintained.
Id. at pages 185, 187.13

Although Keene v. Kimball is dated “November Term 1860,” it
must have been decided some months later, since it relies on
Keene v. Wheatley, which was not decided until early in 1861.

12

See also Crowe v. Aiken (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1870) 6 F.Cas. 904, 907
(No. 3,441) (“the mere representation of a play does not of itself

13
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In two other cases, the plaintiff was allowed to
recover under the federal statutory right of public
performance, where the playwright had registered
the copyright in the manuscript, but had not yet
published the work and deposited the published
copies.14
Thus, when Field published his proposed Civil Code in
1865, and when California adopted its Civil Code in 1872, the
phrase “exclusive ownership” referred to common-law copyright
in an unpublished work, which was limited to the right to
reproduce and sell copies of the work; and public performance
could not be restrained except under the federal copyright
statute, or when copies had been made or obtained in violation of
the common law.15 The phrase “exclusive ownership” in Civil
dedicate it to the public, except, possibly, so far as those who
witness its performance can recollect it.”). Crowe suggested in
dicta that there probably was a common-law right of public
performance, but ultimately rested its holding on the fact that
the defendant had obtained his copy “through a short-hand
reporter, or in some other unauthorized or wrongful way, and not
by memory only.” Ibid.
Roberts v. Myers (C.C.D. Mass. 1860) 20 F.Cas. 898, 898 (No.
11,906) (“The complainant claims as assignee of Boucicault, the
author, who took out a copyright on the 12th of December,
1859.”); Boucicault v. Fox, (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) 3 F.Cas. 977, 977
(No. 1,691) (“On the 12th of December, the plaintiff took out a
copyright for the play.”); id. at page 981 (“the statute upon which
the plaintiff rests for protection, and upon which his suit is
founded . . . is the act of August 18th, 1856 (11 Stat. 138).”).

14

Treatise writer Ethan Drone was the first to posit (in 1879)
that there was a full-blown common-law right of public
performance. Litman, supra, at pages 1410-17. “Drone, did not,
however, rely on judicial reasoning to tell him what the law was.
15
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Code section 980 has been carried forward without change to this
day. The Plaintiff’s suggestion that the Legislature changed the
meaning of the words “exclusive ownership” by amendment,
without changing the words themselves, is implausible and
should be rejected.
II.

FOR 75 YEARS, IT HAS BEEN CONSIDERED
SETTLED LAW THAT THERE IS NO PUBLIC
PERFORMANCE RIGHT FOR SOUND
RECORDINGS.
Since the dawn of radio broadcasting, performers and

record companies have sought to establish a right to exclude
others from publicly performing their sound recordings. See
generally Parks, Music and Copyright in America: Toward the
Celestial Jukebox (2012), pages 101-37. Early answers were
split, with Pennsylvania recognizing a common-law right of
public performance, see Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station
(Pa. 1937) 194 A. 631, and three states (North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Florida) enacting statutes prohibiting recognition
of such a right. See Ringer, Copyright Law Revision Study No.
26, The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings (1957), at
pages 8-9 and n.79.16 In 1940, the Second Circuit decided RCA
Rather, he derived what the law should be from first principles of
natural law, and then criticized the cases that departed from it.”
Id. at page 1411. The fact that some courts later accepted
Drone’s view, and that Keene v. Kimball was overruled by the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1882, could not have been
known to the California Legislature when it adopted the Civil
Code in 1872.
16

Two of those statutes are still in effect. See N.C. Gen. Stat.

19

Manufacturing Co. v. Whiteman (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F.2d 86, cert.
denied (1940) 311 U.S. 712 (hereafter Whiteman), which
questioned the existence of a common-law right of public
performance, and held that even assuming such a right existed,
any such right was divested when the sound recordings were first
sold to the public, notwithstanding the restrictive legend on some
of the records “Not Licensed for Radio Broadcast.” Id. at page
88.17
Although Whiteman was technically decided as a matter of
New York law, “when the Supreme Court refused to hear the case
on December 16, 1940, it became official: Judge Hand’s opinion
was [accepted as] the last word on the legality of broadcasting
sound recordings.” Parks, supra, at page 121. See also Bard and
Kurlantzick, A Public Performance Right in Recordings: How to
Alter the Copyright System Without Improving It (1974) 43 Geo.
Wash. L.Rev. 152, 155 (“The last reported case involving

Ann. § 66-28; S.C. Code Ann. § 39-3-510. Although Florida
repealed its statute effective July 1, 1977, the Florida Supreme
Court recently refused to recognize a public performance right in
sound recordings under Florida common law. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (Fla. 2017) 124 U.S.P.Q.2d 1471.
“[T]he monopoly of the right to reproduce the compositions of
any author—his ‘common-law property’ in them—was not limited
to words; . . . and for the purposes of this case we shall assume
that it covers the performances of an orchestra conductor. . . . [If
so, w]e think that the ‘common-law property’ in these
performances ended with the sale of the records and that the
restriction did not save it; and that if it did, the records
themselves could not be clogged with a servitude.” Id. at page 88.

17
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purported common law performing rights was R.C.A. Mfg Co. v.
Whiteman.”). Instead, “performers refocused their efforts from
the courts to Congress. No fewer than six bills were introduced
between 1942 and 1951; they were designed to bring recordings
under the copyright statute.” Parks, supra, at page 123. All such
efforts failed. Indeed, by the 1950s, the economics of the music
industry were such that record companies paid broadcasters to
play their recordings, rather than vice versa, in order to promote
the sales of records. Id. at page 137; Bard & Kurlantzick, supra,
at page 155.
In 1947, California amended Civil Code section 980 to read
as follows:
The author or proprietor of any composition in letters
or art has an exclusive ownership in the
representation or expression thereof as against all
persons except one who originally and independently
creates a same or similar composition.18

The restriction in section 980 “as against all persons except one
who originally and independently creates a same or similar
composition” was not new. Independent creation has always
been a defense to both federal and statutory copyright, as was
recognized in the 1872 version of Civil Code section 984. The
substance of former Civil Code section 984 was merely
transferred to and combined with section 980. See Legis.
Counsel, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 566 (1947 Reg. Sess.), page 2
(“Section 984 is repealed but present provisions of this section
that ownership of a product of the mind shall be protected
against everyone except one originally producing the same are
retained, as to compositions in letters and art.”). The other
change was changing “any product of the mind” to “any
composition in letters or art,” thereby “excluding such other
intellectual products as inventions from protection under this
18
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At the same time, it amended Civil Code section 983 to
read:
If the owner of a composition in letters or art
publishes it, the same may be used in any manner by
any person, without responsibility to the owner
insofar as the law of this State is concerned.
The change to section 983, from “intentionally makes it
public” to “publishes it,” was intended to make it clear that only
“publication”—the reproduction and sale of copies of a work—
would divest common-law copyright, and that mere public
performance or display, by itself, would not divest common-law
copyright.19 This is perfectly consistent with Whiteman, which
had held that the sale of phonograph records divested any
common-law performance rights which might be thought to exist
in those sound recordings.
The New York Court of Appeals recently reaffirmed that
“New York’s common-law copyright has never recognized a right
of public performance for pre-1972 sound recordings.” Flo &
Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (2016) 28 N.Y.3d 583, 605
(emphasis added); see also id. at page 589. In so holding, it cited
and approved both Palmer v. De Witt and Whiteman, see id. at
chapter.” Id. at page 1. The 1949 amendment reinstated trade
secret protection for inventions and designs, while redesignating
existing section 980 as section 980(a).
See Legis. Counsel, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 566, supra, at page
2 (“Exhibition or performance under conditions which imply no
right to make copies are not held to be publication under these
[case law] precedents, although they may constitute a making
public under present law.”).

19
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pages 595-97,20 and it expressly distinguished later New York
cases as involving only the common-law right of reproduction and
distribution of copies. Id. at pages 597-602. Because California’s
Civil Code was originally based on New York common law, this
Court should infer that the California Legislature in 1947 wanted
to codify existing case law on the issue, which was Whiteman.
In 1971, as a condition of getting federal copyright
protection against unauthorized duplication and sale of
recordings made on or after February 15, 1972, record companies
grudgingly accepted the fact that such federal protection would
likewise not include any public performance right. See Sound
Recording Amendments Act of 1971, Pub.L. No. 92-140 (Oct. 15,
1971), § 1, 85 Stat. 391. Congress expressly had considered
enacting a public performance right for sound recordings; a
previous version of the bill “encompass[ed] a performance right so
that record companies and performing artists would be
compensated when their records were performed for commercial
purposes,” but the public performance right was deliberately
removed from the final legislation. H.R. Rep. 92-487 at page 3
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1568. This
restriction was later codified in Section 114(a) of the 1976
Copyright Act: “The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in

Recall that Palmer v. De Witt was decided in 1872, the same
year that the California Legislature first enacted the disputed
language in Civil Code section 980; and Whiteman was decided in
1940, only seven years before the 1947 amendment to Civil Code
section 980.
20
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a sound recording . . . do not include any right of performance
under section 106(4).” 17 U.S.C. § 114(a). Had record companies
believed at the time that they had a right of public performance
under California law, it is highly doubtful that they would have
accepted a federal law that divested them of any such rights for
sound recordings made on or after February 15, 1972.
It is against this historical backdrop that section 980 was
amended most recently, in 1982. The purpose of the amendment
was to limit the subject matter of that section to those works that
were not preempted by the 1976 Copyright Act; namely,
improvised works not yet fixed in a tangible medium of
expression (§ 980(a)(1)), and sound recordings made before
February 15, 1972 (§ 980(a)(2)). The provisions of former section
983 relating to copyrightable works were repealed, because it was
no longer necessary to specify that state-law protection would
terminate upon first publication. For unfixed works, state-law
would terminate as soon as they were fixed in a tangible medium
(17 U.S.C. § 301(a)); and for pre-1972 sound recordings, Congress
chose to allow states to protect them against unauthorized
reproduction and sale even after “publication” had occurred (17
U.S.C. § 301(c)). There is no indication anywhere in the
legislative history that the California Legislature intended to
change the meaning of “exclusive ownership,” which had never
included a public performance right, or that it intended to create
a public performance right for sound recordings where none had
existed before.
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If, as Plaintiff contends, the phrase “exclusive ownership”
in section 980 was meant to include a public performance right in
sound recordings in California, why did recording companies
publicly complain for decades, both before and after the 1982
amendments, that they did not have a public performance right
in their recordings? 21 Their silence in asserting such a right, and
their vehement public protests about the unfairness of not having
such a right, ought to be conclusive on the question of whether
such a right exists (or ever existed) under Civil Code section 980.
III.

APPLYING A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT
UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW TO NATIONAL
BROADCASTERS WOULD IMPROPERLY EXTEND
CALIFORNIA LAW TO PERFORMANCES
OCCURRING WHOLLY OUTSIDE THE BORDERS
OF THE STATE.
Pandora uses the Internet to carry its broadcasts to

listeners. While Pandora may be able to use geolocation tools to
estimate where many of its listeners are located, such tools are
imperfect and easily circumvented. More importantly, if this
Court were to interpret Civil Code section 980 to grant a public
performance right to owners of sound recordings, for the first
The history of recording industry testimony in Congress about
the lack of an existing public performance right for sound
recordings is well-documented in Pandora’s brief. That the
recording companies were referring to pre-1972 sound recordings
as well as more recent ones is demonstrated by the example that
the RIAA chose to illustrate the issue: Bing Crosby’s classic 1942
recording of “White Christmas.” Report of the Register of
Copyrights, Copyright Implications of Digital Audio
Transmission Services (Oct. 1991), App’x at page 17.
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time, its ruling would not be confined to Pandora and other
Internet broadcasters. It would necessarily also apply to every
radio and television network and broadcast station whose signal
reaches listeners located in California. But broadcast signals
cannot be confined to the borders of a particular state, and
broadcasters are unable to tailor their signal so that it reaches
only listeners who live outside of California. In order to comply
with California law, broadcasters would be required to refrain
from performing pre-1972 sound recordings, which would
interfere with their First Amendment rights to communicate
with listeners who live outside of California. As the Ninth
Circuit recently recognized in Sam Francis Foundation v.
Christie’s, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 784 F.3d 1320 (en banc),
application of California law to transactions located wholly
outside of California violates the dormant commerce clause. See
also Whiteman, 114 F.2d at pages 89-90 (refusing to issue an
injunction based on Pennsylvania law, because broadcast signals
could not be confined to Pennsylvania); Bard & Kurlantzick,
supra, at page 157 (“since radio and television broadcasters are
the predominant public performers of recorded music[,] the
disruption of interstate commerce attributable to state
recognition of a record public performance right would be
considerably more severe than that to be expected from state
anti-piracy legislation.”).
As the district court in a similar case in New York
acknowledged, “the conspicuous lack of any jurisprudential
history confirms that not paying royalties for public performances
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of sound recordings was an accepted fact of life in the
broadcasting industry for the last century.” Flo & Eddie, Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 62 F.Supp.3d 325, 340.
Imposing an obligation to pay such royalties now, retroactively,
on a state-by-state basis, would be incredibly disruptive to the
broadcast industry, and would improperly extend California law
outside of the borders of California. If such a drastic change in
the status quo is to occur, it should be done prospectively, on a
nationwide basis, by Congress, as the Register of Copyrights has
recommended. Report of the Register of Copyrights, Federal
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings (Dec. 2011).
Plaintiff’s frustration with Congressional inaction is not a
sufficient reason to recognize public performance rights under
California law retroactively, 145 years after the disputed
language in Civil Code section 980 was first enacted, and eight
decades after broadcasting was invented.
CONCLUSION
For 75 years, performers and record companies alike
accepted Whiteman as the law and testified in Congress that they
lacked a public performance right in sound recordings. With one
limited exception, Congress has resisted all invitations to enact a
public performance right in sound recordings. It is only
dissatisfaction with Congress’s judgment that has led sound
recording copyright owners to try to get this Court to recognize a
public performance right under state law. When viewed in
historical context, however, it is clear that Civil Code section
980(a)(2) refers only to the common-law right to reproduce and
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